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1 Introduction
The efficient allocation of capital is a key element for the success of an economy.
In advanced countries outstanding credit to non-financial corporations is about
90% of GDP (Figure 1); clearly the allocation of such a large amount of funds
is a first order issue. In fact, one of the main channels through which financial
development accelerates economic growth is exactly by improving the allocation
of capital. This is a traditional argument that several authors have suggested,
including Bagehot (1873), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973),
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Beck et al. (2000), and Levine (2005).
There is an extensive literature on the theoretical mechanisms through which
financial markets improve capital allocation is extensive (Levine, 2005). Boyd
and Prescott (1986) show that financial intermediaries reduce the costs of ac-
quiring information about firms, managers and market conditions, reducing the
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby improving resource allo-
cation. Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) and Jensen (1986) argue that to the extent
that providers of capital can monitor firms, this will make managers maximise
firm value, improving the efficiency of capital usage. Finally, Boyd and Smith
(1992) highlight that financial intermediaries facilitate the pooling of savings,
allowing for better exploitation of economies of scale and overcoming invest-
ment indivisibilities; this improves resource allocation and boost technological
innovation.
However, how can we empirically measure the efficiency of the market in allo-
cating capital? The classical approach is rooted in the Q-theory of investment:
efficieny requires financing firms with a market value below the replacement
value as this gap (Tobin’s Q) signals that profits are expected to rise. Accord-
ingly, the faster the market can direct funds towards high-Q firms, the higher
the efficiency in capital allocation at any point in time. Data limitations, how-
ever, typically make Q-theory based measures of efficiency hard to compute for
a large set of industries and countries; for this reason, alternative measures have
been proposed. Among them, the most influential one is arguably associated
with seminal work by Wurgler (2000) who, in the wake of Hubbard (1998),
suggests to use the elasticity of investment growth (proxying growth in financ-
ing) to value added growth (proxying growth in investment opportunities). In
particular, Wurgler (2000) shows that, for a large sample of countries and indus-
tries, value added growth is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Hence, higher
elasticity of investment growth to value added can be reliably interpreted as an
indicator of better allocative efficiency as funds are more quickly reallocated to
sectors offering higher opportunities. This approach has been used extensively
in the finance literature, including, among others, works by Beck et al. (2007),
Hartmann et al. (2007), Morck et al. (2011), and Lee et al. (2016).
A different approach is followed, instead, in the macroeconomic and growth
literature, where the efficient allocation of capital has been analysed mainly
through the lenses of ‘productivity’, i.e. value added per factor input rather
than value added per se (see, e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Gopinath et al.,
2017). The underlying idea is that funds are efficiently allocated when their
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alternative uses generate the same value added for given amounts of factor in-
puts, or equivalently when the value of the marginal productivity of each factor
is equalized across alternative uses. Any deviation from equalization is inter-
preted as a signal of allocative inefficiency, and the speed at which deviations
are arbitraged out is taken as an indicator of how well the market works. In
this respect, higher elasticity of financing growth to productivity growth would
be an apter measure of efficient capital allocation than higher elasticity to value
added growth.
Our aim is to compare and assess the different implications of the finance
and macro approaches to the measurement of capital allocative efficiency. Our
interest is motivated by the prominent role that productivity has for long-term
growth and, ultimately, by the need of better understanding the link between
finance and growth also from a macroeconomic point of view. In so doing, we
rely on a novel dataset that allows us to tease out the specific relation between
bank financing and productivity growth at firm level for a rich set of industry
in the largest economies of the Eurozone before and after the global financial
crisis.
We proceed in two steps. First, we propose a simple theoretical framework
that can be used to provide guidance on how to interpret the elasticity of credit
to productivity at the firm level. A key insight of the proposed model is that
the sign and the absolute size of the elasticity crucially depends on the extent of
credit frictions. This is due to the presence of two opposing effects of productiv-
ity growth that arise when credit markets are less than complete. We consider
the case of an entrepreneur who pursues short-term and long-term investment
projects with the latter requiring credit. Projects are subject to productiv-
ity shocks and the entrepreneur is also subject to liquidity shocks that may kill
profitable long-term projects before they can actually deliver any return. Credit
constraints limit the amount of bank money the entrepreneur can borrow to face
the liquidity shocks so that she has to rely on own money set aside from the
cash flow generated by her short-term projects.
In this setup, due to credit constraints, positive productivity shocks to
short-term projects have two effects. On the one hand, they make short-term
projects more appealing than long-term ones in terms of intertemporal invest-
ment choices, thereby reducing the entrepreneur’s demand of credit to finance
long-term projects (‘opportunity cost effect’). On the other hand, positive pro-
ductivity shocks to short-term projects increase the short-term cash flow and
thus the entrepreneur’s ability to keep long-term projects alive in case of liquid-
ity shocks, thereby raising the entrepreneur’s credit demand to support those
projects (‘liquidity effect’). The net effect of short-term productivity growth
on bank credit growth is therefore ambiguous, being positive with severe credit
constraints and negative with mild ones, as in the former case the liquidity effect
dominates, while in the latter it is dominated by the opportunity cost effect.
Accordingly, the elasticity of bank credit to short-term productivity can be pos-
itive or negative; the more positive it is, the lower the efficiency of bank credit
allocation. Differently, positive productivity shocks to long-term projects have
only an opportunity cost effect, raising the entrepreneur’s demand of credit to
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support long-term investment: the elasticity of bank credit to long-term produc-
tivity is positive no matter how severe credit constraints are; the more positive
it is, the higher the efficiency of bank credit allocation.
In the second step, we bring the predictions of our theoretical framework to
firm-level data on France, Germany and Italy over the periods 1995-2012, 1997-
2012 and 2001-2012 respectively. This allows us to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the relation between bank credit growth and productivity growth
since the late 1990s and, through the lenses of the model, to make normative
statements about the efficiency of credit allocation across countries, between
small and large firms, as well as before and after the global financial crisis. We
do so by exploiting the novel firm-level dataset of the Competitiveness Research
Network (CompNet) set up by the EU System of Central Banks. A unique
feature of this source is that it provides comparable indicators of detailed firm-
level characteristics across a large set of European Union (EU) countries. We
also leverage the associated research network using data separately managed by
the Banque de France for France, the Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany and
the national statistical institute ISTAT for Italy.
Our empirical findings reveal a clear divide between the Eurozone ‘core’
(France and Germany) and its ‘periphery’ (Italy), with the former exhibiting a
significantly more efficient allocation of credit than the latter, as captured by the
relative strength of the opportunity cost effect with respect to the liquidity effect.
Importantly, if we had relied on the classical measure based on the elasticity
between investment growth and real value added growth, we would have reached
the opposite conclusion, as Italy would have been assessed as more efficient than
Germany. We also find that credit tends to be allocated more efficiently across
small than across large firms, and some evidence that the efficiency of credit
allocation in the Eurozone slightly improves after the global financial crisis.
Our paper not only contributes to the aforementioned literature on the effi-
ciency of capital allocation, but also to the literature on finance and economic
growth such as King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), Rajan and Zingales
(1998), Guiso et al. (2004), Levine (2005), Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006),
and Beck et al. (2008). Finally, it speaks to the literature on resource misal-
location in Europe, such as Gopinath et al. (2017), Calligaris et al. (2017),
and Benigno and Fornaro (2014). These works argue that capital misallocation,
especially after the introduction of the Euro, contributed to the productivity
slowdown of countries in Southern Europe. Our findings on the allocation of
bank credit are consistent with that view.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the the-
oretical model to be used as a guide to interpreting and testing the interaction
between bank credit and productivity. Section 3 presents the empirical spec-
ifications. Section 4 discusses the corresponding empirical results. Section 5
checks their robustness. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Credit and Productivity
This section develops a simple model of firm-level investment that can offer guid-
ance in determining the degree of efficiency in credit allocation with an emphasis
on firm productivity. We consider an entrepreneur who lives for two periods, t
(‘short term’) and t + 1 (‘long term’) and maximizes the linear intertemporal
utility function
Ut = Πt + βΠt+1, (1)
where Πt and Πt+1 are consumption (‘dividends’ or simply ‘profits’) in periods
t and t + 1 respectively, expressed in units of a numeraire good and β ∈ (0, 1)
is a discount factor.
The entrepreneur starts period t with given endowments of labor L and
human capital H. Following Aghion et al. (2010), human capital consists of a
set of skills and know-how that the entrepreneur can use to produce intermediate
capital goods (‘capital’) to be combined with labor for the supply of a final good
either in period t (‘short-term capital’ Kt) or in period t+1 (‘long-term capital’
Zt). The final good is chosen as numeraire.
The technology needed to transform human capital into capital goods is
available only in period t and is linear: Kt + Zt = θH with θ > 0. Units
of human capital are chosen such that θH = 1, which allows us to interpret
Kt and Zt as the shares of short-term and long-term capital. Once produced,
short-term capital Kt is ready to use in period t whereas long-term capital Zt
needs additional tooling at cost ηZt to be paid in period t for use in period
t+ 1 with η ∈ (0, 1). This cost is paid in units of numeraire and has to be paid
upfront before final production takes place in period t. It can thus be incurred
only through borrowing Ft = ηZt from the financial markets as there is no cash
flow available yet.
After Kt has been produced, final production takes place in period t accord-
ing to the Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t , (2)
with capital intensity α ∈ (0, 1) and labor input Lt = L, which we set to one
by choice of units (L = 1). Given that the final product is the numeraire,
Yt = AtK
α
t is also the cash flow generated by the entrepreneur in period t.
Final production in period t + 1 uses an analogous Cobb-Douglas technology
employing again labor and long-term rather than short-term capital:
Yt+1 = At+1Z
α
t L
1−α
t+1 , (3)
which, given Lt+1 = Lt = L = 1, simplifies to Yt+1 = At+1Z
α
t . Central
parameters of interests for our analysis are At and At+1, which measure the
total factor productivity of the entrepreneur and thus her ability to transform
given amounts of inputs into final output. We assume a deterministic trajectory
for the entrepreneur ’s technology so that not only At but also At+1 is known
with certainty already at time t.
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The tooling cost is not the only reason for borrowing. At the end of period t,
after the final production in t has taken place, but t+ 1 has not started yet, the
entrepreneur is hit by a liquidity shock of size St randomly drawn from a con-
tinuous probability distribution. This distribution has c.d.f. Φ (S) = (S/Smax)
φ
for S ∈ [0, Smax] and φ > 0 so that larger φ implies higher probability of large
shocks. If the entrepreneur does not meet the shock, her activity terminates and
production in period t+ 1 does not take place. We assume that there is a sec-
ondary market for long-term capital so that the entrepreneur is always able to
exactly repay Ft with risk-free interest Rt upon liquidation of her activity. The
liquidity shock can be met by using own cash flow if the entrepreneur has set
aside enough from first period production Yt, or by raising additional funding
Bt from the capital markets at risk-free interest rate Rt.
As in Aghion et al (2010), in order to characterize St as a pure liquidity shock,
we assume that, if the entrepreneur meets St at the end of period t, in period
t + 1 she will receive a payment equal to (1 + Rt)St. This allows us to focus
on investment trajectories that would be always worthwhile pursuing by the
enterpreneur in the absence of the liquidity shock. Indeed, with such payment
it will always be in the entrepreneur’s interest to meet the liquidity shock as
long as she has enough resources. As linear utility (1) implies 1 +Rt = β
−1, at
the end of period t the net value of meeting the liquidity shock is(
Yt+1 + β
−1St
)− (1 +Rt)St = Yt+1 > 0. (4)
We consider two cases for the working of capital markets. When capital mar-
kets are ‘complete’, positive continuation value (4) implies that the entrepreneur
can raise as much external funding as she needs to meet the liquidity shock. The
liquidity shock is therefore immaterial for the entrepreneur’s allocation of hu-
man capital between short-term and long-term capital goods supplies. In this
case, in the two periods the entrepreneur faces the following budget constraints.
In period t, profits (Πt), the tooling cost (ηZt) and the liquidity shock (St) have
to be matched by own cash flow (Yt) or external finance (Ft and Bt):
Πt + ηZt + St = Yt + Ft +Bt, (5)
with Ft = ηZt. In period t + 1, profits (Πt+1) and repayments with interest
(Ft (1 +Rt) and (1 +Rt)Bt) have to be matched by cash flow from production
(Yt+1) and reinstated liquidity with interest ((1 +Rt)St):
Πt+1 + Ft (1 +Rt) + (1 +Rt)Bt = Yt+1 + β
−1St. (6)
When capital markets are ‘incomplete’, the entrepreneur faces a borrowing
constraint at the end of period t that prevents her from raising any additional
funding (Bt = 0). Hence, she may meet the liquidity shock only with own cash
flow Yt.
The entrepreneur’s program is then to maximize her payoff (1) subject to the
budget constraints (5) and (6), taking into account the technological possibilities
for intermediate production (Kt +Zt = θH) and final production ((2) and (3)),
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as well as the borrowing possibilities (Ft = ηZt and Bt) at common interest
rate (Rt = β
−1 − 1). When capital markets are incomplete, the entrepreneur
also faces an additional borrowing constraint (Bt = 0).
By substituting the budget constraints into (1), with incomplete markets the
entrepreneur’s program boils down to the maximization of
Ut = Yt − ηZt + βΦ (Yt)Yt+1, (7)
where Φ (Yt) is the probability of surviving the liquidity shock, given that the
largest shock the entrepreneur can afford to meet with own cash flow is St =
Yt. With complete markets there is no such constraint and the probability of
meeting the shock is always Φ = 1 no matter how large the shock is. Further
substituting the final production functions (2) and (3) into (7) gives
Ut = AtK
α
t − ηZt + βΦ (AtKαt )At+1Zαt , (8)
with Φ = 1 when financial markets are complete. As the solution of the en-
trepreneur’s program will reveal, a crucial implication of expression (8) is that
with incomplete markets a positive productivity shock raising productivity At
in period t increases the return to capital both in period t and in period t+ 1,
whereas with complete markets it increases the return to capital only in pe-
riod t. In the latter case, a standard ‘opportunity cost effect’ is at work that
increases the incentive to invest in short-term capital Kt. In the former case,
the opportunity cost effect is also at work but it is counterbalanced by an op-
posite ‘liquidity effect’, by which larger At increases the cash flow in period
t and, through this channel, the entrepreneur’s ability to meet the liquidity
shock (Yt rises). Hence, whereas with complete capital markets larger At makes
the entrepreneur increase her supply of short-run capital Kt to the detriment
of long-run capital Zt = 1 − Kt, with incomplete capital markets it may lead
to the opposite outcome whenever the increase in the probability of surviving
thanks to more liquidity available is strong enough. When this happens, the
liquidity effect dominates the opportunity cost effect.
Given that the tooling cost of long-term capital is covered by borrowing
(Ft = ηZt), a further implication is that a positive productivity shock in period
t decreases borrowing with complete markets. Differently, with incomplete mar-
kets a positive productivity shock in period t increases borrowing whenever the
associated liquidity effect is strong enough, as in this case the ability to meet
the liquidity shock is tied to productivity through cash flow. This ambiguity
does not arise, instead, for productivity shocks happening in period t + 1 as
these shocks have no bearing on cash flow in period t and thus do not have any
liquidity effect.
Further comparison between complete and incomplete markets sheds ad-
ditional light on how the liquidity effect works. With complete markets the
entrepreneur is able to achieve her unconstrained optimal amount of long-term
capital Z∗t . Differently, with incomplete markets the chosen (cash-flow) con-
strained optimal amount Zt is below the optimal target: Zt < Z
∗
t . In this case,
though larger At makes the unconstrained Z
∗
t fall due to the opportunity cost
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effect, the constrained Zt can actually rise as long as, by increasing available
cash flow, larger At increases Zt towards the falling but still larger target Z
∗
t .
Formally, given (8) and Φ = 1, with complete markets the entrepreneur
solves the following Lagrangean problem:
max
Kt,Zt
= AtK
α
t − ηZt + βAt+1Zαt + qt (1−Kt − Zt) ,
where qt is the Lagrangean multiplier on the human capital resource constraint.
Given (8) and Φ = (AtK
α
t /Smax)
φ
, with incomplete markets she solves instead
the problem:
max
Kt,Zt
= AtK
α
t − ηZt + βAt+1 (AtKαt /Smax)φ Zαt + qt (1−Kt − Zt) ,
where (AtK
α
t /Smax)
φ
is the probability of meeting the liquidity shock given
cash flow AtK
α
t in period t. Larger φ implies larger positive impact of higher
productivity At on that probability. The FOCs of these problems determine the
optimal level of long-term capital Zt (to which corresponds the optimal level of
borrowing Ft = ηZt) as the solution the following equation:
1
αAt (1− Zt)α−1 − η
αAtZ
α−1
t
= β
At+1
At
[
(Smax)
−φ
Aφt (1− Zt)αφ
(
1− φ Zt
1− Zt
)]
,
(9)
where in the case of complete markets the bracketed term equals 1 as the prob-
ability of meeting the liquidity shock is constant and equal to 1.2
Given α ∈ (0, 1), the left-hand side of (9) is an increasing function of Zt
whereas its right-hand side is a decreasing function of Zt as long as both sides
are positive. Hence, parameter conditions that ensure that the left-hand and
right-hand sides of (9) cross in the relevant range Zt ∈ (0, 1) also imply that the
corresponding value of long-term capital is the unique solution to (9).
Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a graphical local representation of the
solution of (9) with complete and incomplete markets respectively. In both
figures the solid line LHS refers to the left-hand side of (9), which is increasing
in Zt and is the same for both complete and incomplete markets. In Figure 2
the solid line RHSc refers to the right-hand side of (9) with complete contracts
(i.e. with the bracketed term equal to 1 ) and it is flat as no Zt appears on that
side when the probability of meeting the liquidity shock is 1. The entrepreneur’s
optimal choice with complete contracts is initially determined by point A at the
crossing between LHS and RHSc. When At increases, LHS shifts up to LHS
′
whereas RHSc does not move. The corresponding new optimal choice is then
determined by the new crossing Ac between LHS′ and RHSc, which is associated
with a fall of long-term capital from Zt to Z
c
t .
In Figure 3 the solid line RHS refers to the right-hand side of (9) with
incomplete contracts and accordingly it is decreasing in Zt. The entrepreneur’s
1See the Appendix for a detailed derivation.
2The bracketed term is also equal to 1 when φ goes to 0 as in the limit the probability of
liquidity shocks of positive size goes to 0.
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optimal choice with incomplete contracts is again initially determined by point
A at the crossing between LHS and RHS. When At increases, LHS shifts up to
LHS′ as in Figure 2. However, with incomplete markets, the final outcome in
terms of long-term capital and borrowing is ambiguous because there are three
cases. First, for φ = 1, larger At does not affect RHS as with complete markets,
due to the fact that the liquidity effect is not at work. Second, for φ < 1,
larger At shifts RHS down to RHS
′ so that the new optimal choice corresponds
to point A′ with lower long-term capital Z ′t. Hence, in this second case the
qualitative behaviour of the model is also the same as with complete markets,
this time due to the fact that the opportunity cost effect dominates the liquidity
effect. The reason for this is that, when φ is small, larger At has a small impact
on the probability of meeting the liquidity shock . Third, for φ > 1, larger At
shifts RHS up to RHS′′ so that the new optimal choice corresponds to point
A′′ with higher long-term capital Z ′′t . In this third case it is the liquidity effect
that dominates the opportunity cost effect as, when φ ¿1, larger At has a higher
impact on the probability of meeting the liquidity shock.
Whether financial markets are complete or incomplete has, instead, no bear-
ing on the qualitative impact of an increase in future productivity At+1 on
long-term capital and borrowing. Graphically, if At+1 increased, the right-hand
side of (9) would shift up both with complete and incomplete markets. As a
result, Zt would increase in both cases, leading to more long-term capital and
more borrowing.
We can summarise these findings as:
Proposition 1. If productivity growth in period t leads to an increase
(decrease) in borrowing in period t, the associated liquidity effect is strong
(weak) and the inefficiency in capital allocation due to incomplete financial
markets is more (less) pronounced. Differently, productivity growth in period
t + 1 always leads to an increase in borrowing in period t irrespective of the
degree of financial market incompleteness.
Proposition 1 highlights that the contemporaneous net effect of productivity
growth on bank credit growth is ambiguous, being positive with severe credit
constraints and negative with mild ones: the liquidity effect dominates in the
former case and is dominated by the opportunity cost effect in the latter. Ac-
cordingly, the sign and the absolute size of the contemporaneous elasticity of
bank credit growth to productivity growth can be used to assess the efficiency
of the allocation of credit across firms. A positive sign of the elasticity signals
low efficiency, the more so the larger its absolute value. Differently, a negative
sign of the elasticity signals high efficiency, the more so the larger its absolute
value.
In the next section we will use these insights to assess and compare the
efficiency of the credit allocation across firms in the three largest Eurozone
economies since the late 1990s.
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3 Data Description
We use a novel firm-level dataset based on the CompNet database (www.comp-
net.org) kick-started by the European Central Bank (ECB). A unique feature of
this source is that it provides comparable indicators of detailed firm-level char-
acteristics across a large set of European Union (EU) countries. Firm-level data
are extremely sensitive and are handled by different national institutions under
severe confidentiality requirements that typically make the creation of pooled
cross-country firm-level datasets very hard. CompNet has managed to reduce
the shortcomings of this situation for research by agreeing with the different
national institutions a common protocol on how harmonized indicators should
be defined and produced for detailed categories of firms. It has also created a
network of researchers in the different national institutions that cooperate in
the production of additional specific ouputs that are not included in the shared
database.
Our analysis leverages both the CompNet database and the associated re-
search network using data separately managed by the Banque de France for
France, the Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany and the national statistical in-
stitute ISTAT for Italy. These institutions combine multiple sources of national
administrative data (such as financial statements, fiscal forms, firm surveys,
employment registries) to offer complete and detailed overviews of firm charac-
teristics in the corresponding countries.
Table 1 shows the number of years, the number of firms and the original
source of data by country. Even though variables are harmonised across coun-
tries, there are still some differences in terms of years of coverage and number
of firms available. Nonetheless, this incomplete overlap pales in front of the
representativeness of the sample and the richness of available variables, which
are unique cross-country characteristics of the CompNet database.3 In particu-
lar, for France, Germany and Italy Table 1 reveals that the firms in the sample
cover between 27% and 43% of value added in national accounts and between
20% to 36% of total employment. Table 2 reports, instead, the employment
distributions by firm size class in CompNet and Eurostat, highlighting remark-
able sample representativeness for all three countries as the two distributions
are very similar.
For each firm in the sample we have information on various measures of
‘productivity’, such as total factor productivity (TFP), marginal product of
capital and labor productivity, as well as data on real value added. Firm-level
TFP is computed using the approach of Wooldridge (2009), which hinges on
previous work by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinshon and Petrin (2003).4
The marginal product of capital is defined as the ratio of real value added over
capital stock accounting for the firm-level elasticity of capital in the produc-
tion function. Labor productivity is defined as real value added per employee.
3A detailed overview of the CompNet database can be found in Lopez-Garcia and di Mauro
(2015).
4See Appendix A.2 for additional details on how TFP is estimated from firms’ balance
sheets.
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Finally, real value added is computed using country-sector specific deflators.
For each firm we also have information on bank credit, leverage and return on
assets. Bank credit corresponds to the entry ‘liabilities to financial institutions’.
in firm’s balance sheets.5 Returns on assets are defined as operating profit/loss
over total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
4 Econometric Specification
The traditional empirical approach to assess the efficiency of credit allocation is
to regress the growth rate of investments (a proxy for credit) on the growth rate
of real value added (a proxy for investment opportunities) at the industry level
(Wurgler, 2000). The size of the resulting estimated elasticity of investment to
real value added measures how fast credit is directed to its most promising uses
and thus how efficiently credit is allocated at any point in time.
Our empirical approach is close to the traditional approach, but it aims to
bring it forward in three main respects. First, we are able to look at credit
directly without having to use investment as a proxy. Second, we can run the
analysis at the firm level rather than at the industry level, thus capturing the
within-sector dimension of allocative efficiency. Third, we bring productivity
growth into the main picture as an aspect of investment opportunities that may
be important for the assessment of efficient capital allocation across firms.
Following the implications of the model proposed in Section 2, our main
specification investigates the relations of credit growth with current and future
productivity growth separately. For comparison with the traditional approach,
we also run the same specification using current and future real value added
growth. The specification is run independently for each country (given that,
as discussed in Section 3, data cannot be pooled) with yearly time frequency.
Specifically, omitting the country index for parsimonious notation, we run the
following regressions for firm i in year t:
CreditGrowthit = β0 + β1ProductivityGrowthit (10)
+β2GrowthWithInternalFundsit
+β3Leverageit−1 + δt + ψi + it
and
CreditGrowthit = α0 + α1ProductivityGrowthit+1 (11)
+α2GrowthWithInternalFundsit
+α3Leverageit−1 + δt + ψi + it.
Analogous regeressions are also run replacing productivity growth with real
value added growth. In (10) and (11) the main coefficients of interest are β1
5We do not have data on issued shares and data on bonds are scarce. This should not
introduce any relevant bias in our results as the number of firms that issue bonds in our
sample is very limited.
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and α1 as these capture the relation of credit growth with current and future pro-
ductivity growth respectively. The regressions are saturated with a series of con-
trols and fixed effects to account for possibly relevant aspects our simple model
abstracts from. In particular, ‘Leveraget−1’ is introduced as a proxy of firm
financial health and controls for its risk profile. ‘GrowthWithInternalFundsit’
controls for different demand of credit across firms and refers to the maximum
level of growth that a firm can attain without external finance. This measure
depends on the firm’s return on assets (ROA) and is computed following the
‘percentage of sales’ approach to financial planning (Higgins, 1977; Guiso et al.,
2004) to obtain a firm-level measure of external financial dependence.6 The
time dummy δt captures shocks common to all firms while the firm fixed effect
ψi absorbs the firm’s time invariant characteristics that may affect credit pro-
vision but are not in the model (such as skills and human capital) as well as
the intrinsic external financial needs of the specific sector the firm operates in.7
In the baseline specification, productivity is measured as TFP while we use the
marginal product of capital and labor productivity to check robustness.
Three remarks on specification (10) and (11) are in order. First, when
looking at β1 and α1 through the lenses of Proposition 1, we expect α1 to be
positive while the sign and absolute size of β1 is informative about constraints
that hamper an efficient credit allocation: negative β1 signals efficiency, the
more so the larger it is; positive β1 signals inefficiency, the more so the larger it
is in absolute value.
Second, reverse causality might appear to be a concern as credit may lead to
a contemporaneous change in productivity and also affect future productivity.
However, our main objective is not to identify causality, but to look at β1 and
α1 as coefficients that capture the equilibrium relation between productivity
and credit. Moreover, as we show in Appendix A.2, the measure of capital that
we use to compute TFP is a function of past investments, which implies that
the estimated productivity at time t does not depend on capital, and thus on
credit, at time t. While this mitigates the concern of reverse causality for β1
in equation (10), credit at time t could still affect capital at time t and thus
measured productivity at time t+ 1. This concern of reverse causality for α1 in
equation (11) could also be someway mitigated if one considers that, as stressed
by Wurgler (2000), capital might need up to two years since installation before
becoming productive.
Third, in regression (11) as in the model we do not draw a distinction be-
tween unobserved future expected productivity growth and its observed realiza-
tionl. The two measures would be equivalent only if banks had perfect foresight.
As this is unlikely to hold in reality, it introduces some measurement error in
the independent variable of interest and generates an attenuation bias in the
estimates. In this respect, our results can be seen as providing a lower bound
for the elasticity of credit to expected productivity as well as for the elasticity
6Specifically, we define: GrowthWithInternalFundsit = ROA/(1 − ROA). In Higgins
(1977) this is called ‘maximum rate of internally financed growth’ and is used to derive
‘FinancialDemandit’= 1−ROA/(1−ROA).
7We also tried to add sector-time dummies but results barely changed.
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differences across countries.
5 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents our main results. The first row shows the elasticity of credit
to TFP and real value added by country at t and t + 1.8 For France and
Germany the table reveals a significant negative elasticity of credit to current
productivity (β1 < 0) and a significant positive elasticity of credit to future
productivity (α1 > 0). For Italy, the elasticity of credit to future productivity is
again significantly positive though smaller in size (α1 > 0). However, that turns
out to hold also for the elasticity of credit to current productivity (β1 > 0).
According to Proposition 1, this is evidence that the opportunity cost effect
of current productivity growth dominates in France and Germany while its
liquidity effect dominates in Italy. For this reason credit allocation appears to
more efficient in the former countries than in the latter. Moreover, as the size of
the coefficients is larger for France than for Germany, credit allocation appears
to be more efficient in France than in Germany.
Interestingly, the second row of Table 3 shows also that, if we had relied
on the traditional assessment of efficient credit allocation based on the rela-
tion between credit growth and current real value added growth, we would
have reached quite different and possibly misleading conclusions. In particular,
Germany exhibits an elasticity of credit to current real value added not signifi-
cantly different from zero, compared to significantly positive elasticities of 17%
and 11% for France and Italy respectively. Therefore, following the traditional
approach we would have concluded that credit is allocated more efficiently in
Italy than in Germany. This does not seem to be plausible as one would need to
explain why firms in Germany are more credit constrained than firms in Italy.
Table 4 extends the analysis by looking at differences between large and
small firms.9 The table shows that the baseline results are qualitatively con-
firmed across firm size classes for both measures and all three countries. The
only exception concerns large firms in Italy, for which the elasticities of bank
credit to current and future productivity are not significantly different from zero.
While the lack of significant correlation between credit growth and current pro-
ductivity growth could be interpreted through the model in terms of offsetting
opportunity cost and liquidity effects, the insignificant relation of credit growth
with future productivity growth is hard to explain unless Italian firms and banks
do not have productivity growth in their radar when demanding and supplying
external finance. Turning to France and Germany, Table 4 reveals significant
differences in the magnitude of the coeffcients between small and large firms.
The elasticity of credit to productivity is inversely correlated with firm size,
which suggests that bank credit is allocated more efficiently across small than
large firms. A possible explanation for this finding is that relational banking
8For ease of exposition, we present only the main coefficients of the regressions. The full
tables of these regressions are reported in Appendix A.3.
9The threshold between small and large firms that we apply is 50 employees.
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may matter more for large firms. Given that large firms are cross-selling clients
for which credit represents only one of many financial services they may ask
from banks, these could choose to finance also less promising projects by such
firms provided that the overall business relation remains profitable. Nonethe-
less, while this strategy can be individually optimal from a bank’s perspective,
it still has macroeconomic implication in terms of credit misallocation from an
aggregate productivity perspective. A second possible explanation is that large
firms are less dependent from bank credit than small firms thanks to better
access to capital markets. A third explanation could be that the average com-
mitment and complexity of credit to larger firms is higher so that it might be
more complicated to reallocate credit between large than small firms.
6 Robustness Checks
In this section we focus on two main issues. First, we analyse the robustness
of our findings to alternative measures of firm productivity. Second, we check
whether the global financial crisis plays any role in shaping those findings.
It might be argued that the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK)
rather than TFP is the relevant measure of productivity from the point of view
of banks. Moreover, TFP as well as the marginal product of capital could be
more difficult to compute for credit institutions than labor productivity. Table
5 reports the estimates of β1 and α1 from regressions (10) and (11) when TFP
is replaced by MRPK and labor productivity (‘LProd’) as measures of firm
productivity. We find that for France and Germany the results are virtually
unchanged. Credit at time t exhibits significant negative elasticity (β1 < 0) with
respect to both measures at time t and significant positive elasticity (α1 > 0)
at time t+ 1. In the case of Italy the same holds for labor productivity both at
t and t+ 1, but only at t+ 1 for MRPK as the elasticity of credit to MRPK is
significantly negative. That said, the absolute sizes of the Italian elasticities of
credit to MRPK are both an order of magnitude smaller than the French and
German ones, confirming that credit is less efficiently allocated in Italy than in
France and Germany. Moreover, they are so small that, even though statistically
different from zero, they are hardly different from zero from an economic point
of view.
Turning to the global financial crisis, Table 6 splits the sample between pre-
2008 and post-2009 periods. From a qualitative viewpoint, the results for all
three countries do not change before and after the crisis. They change, however,
from a quantitative viewpoint. For Germany there is some evidence of credit
allocation becoming slightly more effcient after the crisis, as the elasticities of
credit to TFP at time t and t+1 become larger in size. The opposite is observed
for France, although the sizes of the French elasticities remain significantly larger
than the German one. Differently, for Italy there is virtually no change between
the two periods. These results suggest that the baseline findings are not driven
by the global financial crisis.
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7 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the measurement of efficient capital
allocation by credit markets. Focusing on bank credit and firm productivity, it
has extended the traditional approach that assesses allocative efficiency through
the elasticity of investment to real value added. In particular, we have proposed
a new methodology based in a simple model of investment linking the signs and
absolute sizes of the elasticities of credit to current and future productivity to the
harshness of credit constraints. the model highlights that the contemporaneous
net effect of productivity growth on bank credit growth is ambiguous: positive
with severe credit constraints and negative with mild ones as a liquidity effect
dominates in the former case and an opportunity cost effect dominates in the
latter. In light of model, a positive elasticity of credit to contemporaneous
productivity growth signals low efficiency, the more so the larger its absolute
value; a negative elasticity signals instead high efficiency, the more so the larger
its absolute value.
We have used this conceptual framework to assess the efficiency of credit
allocation in the three largest Eurozone (France, Germany and Italy), exploiting
a unique micro dataset based on the CompNet database created by the ECB.
This dataset has allowed us to estimate the elasticity of credit to current and
future productivity and real value added at the firm level. For France and
Germany we have found significantly negative elasticity of credit to current
productivity and significantly positive elasticity of credit to future productivity.
Also for Italy the elasticity of credit to future elasticity, though smaller, has been
found again significantly positive. However, the elasticity of credit to current
productivity has turned out to be also significantly positive. Reading these
results through the lenses of our model suggests that credit allocation is more
effiecient in France and Germany than in Italy. While this finding is hardly
surprising, it should be seen as a promising feature of our new methodology,
given that we have also shown that the traditional approach based on real value
added rather than productivity delivers the opposite and arguably implausible
conclusion that credit is more efficiently allocated in Italy than in Germany.
When comparing different firm size classes, we have found that the elasticity
of credit to productivity is generally higher for small than large firms, suggesting
that credit is allocated more efficiently among the former than the latter. This
is an important finding as large firms represent a dominant share of employment
and value added in our sample economies.
Finally, we have shown that our results are robust to alternative measures
of productivity, and hold qualitatively both before and after the global finan-
cial crisis. The estimated elasticities of credit to productivity are nonetheless
quantitatively different in the pre- and post-crisis periods. In Germany credit
allocation appears to become more efficient after the crisis while the opposite
pattern is observed in France. Differently, in Italy there is virtually no change
between the two periods.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Credit to non-financial corporations
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Figure 2: Productivity and borrowing with complete markets
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Figure 3: *
Productivity and borrowing with incomplete markets
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Tables
Table 1: Sample summary
Country France Germany Italy
Data Source Banque de France Bundesbank ISTAT
Years 1995-2012 1997-2012 2001-2012
Firms 93,569 42,726 393,489
Observations 589,609 184,807 1,721,881
Value added vs Eurostat 43% 32% 27%
Total employment vs. Eurostat 36% 20% 30%
Table 2: Employment distribution by firm size class, CompNet and Eurostat
Size class 20-49 50-249 250 +
Eurostat CompNet Eurostat CompNet Eurostat CompNet
France 18% 17.7% 24.6% 25% 57.4% 57.3%
Germany 14.9% 14% 29.1% 29.5% 56% 56.5%
Italy 24.1% 24.3% 29.4% 28.9% 46.5% 46.8%
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Table 3: Baseline results on loans
Elasticity of credit to: France Germany Italy
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1
TFP -0.27*** 0.15*** -0.08*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
RVA 0.17*** 0.23*** -0.001 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.01) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. TFP is total factor produc-
tivity and RVA is real value added, as defined in Section 3. The elasticities are
computed separately by country at time t and t + 1 using equations (10) and
(11). All specifications include controls, time dummies, and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
Table 4: Results by firm size
Elasticity of France Germany Italy
credit to
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1
TFP Small -0.29*** 0.18*** -0.09*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
Large -0.22*** 0.09*** -0.08*** 0.05*** -0.002 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
RVA Small 0.15*** 0.20*** -0.003 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.002) (0.007)
Large 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.003
(0.01) (0.02) (0.009) (0.008) (0.01) (0.002)
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. TFP is total factor produc-
tivity and RVA is real value added, as defined in Section 3. The elasticities are
computed separately by country at time t and t + 1 using equations (10) and
(11) for each sub-sample of firm size. All specifications include controls, time
dummies, and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sector
level.
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Table 5: Robustness to alternative productivity measures
Elasticity of credit to: France Germany Italy
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1
MRPK -0.51*** 0.08*** -0.24*** 0.05*** -0.003*** 0.002***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
LProd -0.17*** 0.10*** -0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.008) (0.01) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. MRPK is the marginal
product of capital and LProd is labor productivity as defined in Section 3.
The elasticities are computed separately by country at time t and t + 1 using
equations (10) and (11). All specifications include controls, time dummies, and
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
Table 6: Results pre- and post-crisis
Elasticity of France Germany Italy
credit to
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1
TFP Pre-crisis -0.32*** 0.16*** -0.07*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.001)
Post-crisis -0.23*** 0.12*** -0.11*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
RVA Pre-crisis 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.003 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.006) (0.02)
Post-crisis 0.14*** 0.11*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. TFP is total factor produc-
tivity and RVA is real value added, as defined in Section 3. The elasticities are
computed separately by country at time t and t + 1 using equations (10) and
(11) for each sub-sample of firm size. All specifications include controls, time
dummies, and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sector
level
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Appendix A.1: Opportunity vs. Liquidity
Given (8) and Φ (S) = (S/Smax)
φ
, with incomplete markets the entrepreneur
solves the following Lagrangean problem:
max
Kt,Zt
= AtK
α
t − ηZt + β (Smax)−φ (AtKαt )φAt+1Zαt + qt (1−Kt − Zt)
where qt is the Lagrangean multiplier on the human capital resource constraint.
The FOCs with respect to Kt and Zt are
αAtK
α−1
t + β (Smax)
−φ
Aφt αφK
αφ−1
t At+1Z
α
t = qt
and
−η + β (Smax)−φAφtKαφt At+1αZα−1t = qt
respectively, which together imply
αAtK
α−1
t + η
AtαZ
α−1
t
= β
At+1
At
[
(Smax)
−φ
AφtK
αφ
t
(
1− φ Zt
Kt
)]
. (12)
The FOC with respect to qt recovers the resource constraint
1−Kt − Zt = 0,
which allows us to rewrite (12) as an implicit function of Zt only:
αAt (1− Zt)α−1 − η
αAtZ
α−1
t
= β
Aet+1
At
[
(Smax)
−φ
Aφt (1− Zt)αφ
(
1− φ Zt
1− Zt
)]
.
which is equation (9) in the main text.
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Appendix A.2: Estimation of Firm-Level TFP
The starting point of the estimation of firm-level TFP is the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function for firm i at time t
Yit = AitK
α
itL
1−α
it
where Yit is real value added, Kit is the real book value of net capital, Lit is
total employment, and Ait is TFP.
Estimating TFP using a standard Cobb-Douglas setting is subject to endo-
geneity problems between the input levels and the unobserved firm-specific pro-
ductivity. Following Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinshon and Petrin (2003),
the unobserved firm-specific productivity is controlled for by a proxy derived
from a structural model. This proxy is a function of capital and material in-
puts, approximated by a third-order polynomial as in Petrin et al. (2004).
Specifically, the following regression is estimated on a 2-digit industry level
using GMM, with the moments restrictions specified as in Woolridge (2009):
yi(t) = β0 + β1ki(t) + β2ki(t−1) + β3mi(t−1) + β4k2i(t−1) + β5m
2
i(t−1) + β6k
3
i(t−1)
+β7m
3
i(t−1) + β8ki(t−1)mi(t−1) + β9ki(t−1)m
2
i(t−1) + β10k
2
i(t−1)mi(t−1)
+γY eart + ωli(t)
All variables are in logs: yi(t) is real value added of firm i in year t, ki(t) is its
real book value of net capital, mi(t) is material inputs, li(t) is total employment,
Y eart is a time dummy. While capital is assumed to take time to build, labor
and TFP are simultaneously determined, so labor is instrumented by its first
lag. TFP is then computed as
TFPi(t) = rvai(t) −
(
β̂0 + β̂1ki(t) + γ̂Y eart + ω̂li(t)
)
Two key assumptions of this methodology are that: i) productivity follows
a first-order Markov process; and ii) capital is assumed to be a function of past
investments and not current ones. These assumptions imply that productivity
shocks at time t do not depend on capital at time t, but only on past productivity
realizations. They also imply that an increase in bank credit at time t, even if
used for investment, does not affect capital at time t as capital needs time to
build up.
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Appendix A.3: Complete Tables, Baseline Re-
gression by Country
Table 7: France
Elasticity of credit to: (1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPt -0.27***
(0.01)
TFPt+1 0.15***
(0.01)
RVAt 0.17***
(0.008)
RVAt+1 0.23***
(0.01)
Leveraget−1 -1.88*** -1.93*** -1.88*** -1.90***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.009) (0.02)
Maximum internally -0.56*** -0.61*** -0.77*** -0.62***
financed growth (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 590,985 589,600 724,711 624,086
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. As defined in Section 3
TFP is total factor productivity and RVA is real value added, Leverage is the
ratio of total debt on total assets, Maximum internally financed growth is the
maximum level of growth reachable without external finance as defined in Guiso
et al. (2004) and Higgins (1977). The elasticities are computed separately by
country at time t and t + 1 using equations (10) and (11). All specifications
include controls, time dummies, and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the sector level.
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Table 8: Germany
Elasticity of credit to: (1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPt -0.08***
(0.007)
TFPt+1 0.06***
(0.008)
RVAt -0.001
(0.006)
RVAt+1 0.09***
(0.007)
Leveraget−1 -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.68*** -0.70***
(0.002) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Maximum internally -0.002 -0.01 -0.002 -0.008*
financed growth (0.002) (0.006) (0.02) (0.005)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 186,015 184,807 267,955 202,574
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. As defined in Section 3
TFP is total factor productivity and RVA is real value added, Leverage is the
ratio of total debt on total assets, Maximum internally financed growth is the
maximum level of growth reachable without external finance as defined in Guiso
et al. (2004) and Higgins (1977). The elasticities are computed separately by
country at time t and t + 1 using equations (10) and (11). All specifications
include controls, time dummies, and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the sector level.
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Table 9: Italy
Elasticity of credit to: (1) (2) (3) (4)
TFPt 0.02***
(0.001)
TFPt+1 0.02***
(0.001)
RVAt 0.11***
(0.003)
RVAt+1 0.001
(0.005)
Leveraget−1 -1.21*** -1.23*** -1.22*** -1.22***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)
Maximum internally -0.17*** -0.10*** -0.28*** -0.11***
financed growth (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
Observations 1,721,881 1,705,251 2,322,067 1,844,144
***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. As defined in Section 3
TFP is total factor productivity and RVA is real value added, Leverage is the
ratio of total debt on total assets, Maximum internally financed growth is the
maximum level of growth reachable without external finance as defined in Guiso
et al. (2004) and Higgins (1977). The elasticities are computed separately by
country at time t and t + 1 using equations (10) and (11). All specifications
include controls, time dummies, and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the sector level.
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